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Cyber: The Ultimate Political Weapon
Shafali Raj

Abstract
Cyber is one of the newest frontiers we face as a modern society. There
are many unknowns when it comes to this intangible platform that has
become shared globally. Political Science takes an interest in cyber because
today it is used as a battle ground for attackers on the international scale. Our
understanding of cyber warfare is still emerging, and much scholarship fails
to discuss the usage of the United States’ use of such weapons. This paper
goes beyond a discussion of coders and hackers leaking into government data
and instead focuses on the evidence of cyber as a weapon in world politics.
Through three qualitative case studies, I will reveal the use of cyber for
informational, psychological, and physical endeavors globally.

Introduction
On March 16th, 2018 Samantha Raphelson with NPR reported on
accusations from the Department of Homeland Security on Russian
involvement in various cyber-attacks on US power grids. The report
released by DHS emphasized the imminent cyber threats and described
them as attacks on energy, nuclear, water, aviation, manufacturing, and
commercial facilities within the United States, perpetrated by actors from
around the world.1 One investigation detailed in the DHS report referred to
the findings of American cybersecurity firm, Symantec, regarding a group
named Dragonfly that broke into core operations of energy companies in the
US and Europe.2 Additionally, DHS official, Amit Yoran, describes other
1 Raphelson Samantha, “Report Russian Hackers Had the Ability to Shut Down U.S.
Power Plants.” National Public Radio (March 16, 2018)
2 Ibid

2

PAIDEIA

foreign attacks such as Russian meddling in public infrastructure and the
2016 election as “unprecedented and extraordinary” in the report.3 Officials
from the DHS as well as heads of cybersecurity companies stress the ability
of Russians to interfere with critical US infrastructure, stating they have
already employed attacks as far back as last March. Such findings prove the
existence of cyber as a weapon.
The release of the DHS report represents change because it is the
first time the United States government has openly held foreign actors
accountable for a cyber-attack. The DHS report also discusses an imminent
or impending threat using cyber weapons, which represents a shift in warfare
to methods outside traditional means. This article specifically focuses on the
open accusations and warning from the DHS on Russian attacks in various
industries such as those on power grids in Texas.4 Raphelson’s story makes
it apparent that security officials fear Russian attacks like those made on
Ukrainian industries just two years earlier that were also mentioned in her
article. However, it is important to contextualize these events. the United
States continues to be a world power, leveraging its influence and capabilities
to achieve certain goals. With this background in mind, the released DHS
report become questionable, leading us to contemplate the real capabilities of
the United States.
Yet this DHS report is important for world politics because the new
strategies and intelligence stipulated by the United States will influence the
actions of states all around the world. In addition, it poses the United States
at the receiving end of a threat, which suggests cybersecurity is a top concern
for the US and future policy decisions. This is the first time the United States
has accused foreign actors such as Russia for outright interference in industry
and political happenings and is momentous in the formation of future policy.5
In addition, the DHS report does not address the fact the United States has
been involved in and contemplated cyber-attacks such as those on the Iranian
power grid.6 The open discussion on cyber as a domain of war will change
world politics forever as new weapons and methods enters the forefront
of warfare. The report also does not consider accepted norms such as US
military strength and its increased presence abroad, which leads me to ask the
following research question, how does the United States utilize cyber as an
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
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offensive weapon in world politics? I will answer this question by analyzing
effects on environment, human rights, and labor standards.

Conventional Wisdom
The contemporary perceptions surrounding cyber threats is that most
Americans are not confident in the United States’ security capabilities.
According to a Pew Research Center public opinion poll, seventy percent of
Americans believe the United States will experience a major cyber-attack on
public infrastructure within the next five years.7 The same study found that
only thirteen percent of participants feel that the United States government is
“very” prepared for a cyber-attack. In addition, a poll performed by Gallup
found that seventy-three percent of American adults ranked cyber-terrorism
as a top three critical threat to US interests.8 These two public opinion polls
reflect the common feeling of insecurity amongst US citizens when it comes
to matters of cyber. These findings present the conventional wisdom that the
United States is not prepared for a cyber-attack or that the military has yet
developed the tools to combat such threats.
However, the current conventional wisdom surrounding US cyber
threats is extremely misleading. Most Americans are unaware of the
capabilities the United States has developed and has already utilized. My
research challenges the conventional wisdom regarding cybersecurity by
exposing the uses of cyber as a weapon by the United States itself. Although
common rhetoric puts the United States at the hands of foreign cyber threats,
it is vital to understand that the United States remains a global power and
is willing to utilize cyber in international politics. The released DHS report
mentioned earlier might fuel paranoia amongst US citizens, but my research
challenges the idea that the United States will be the victim of a crippling
cyber-attack.

Case Study: Informational Cyber Tactics
Information warfare has been a legitimate strategy of the United States’
military for decades and continues to be applied to new domains of warfare
such as cyber. Unlike armed warfare, information warfare might take on
more discrete forms and will always hold a political target. For instance, a
Congressional Research Service Report defines information warfare through
7 “Americans and Cybersecurity,” Pew Research Center (January 26, 2017)
8 “Americans Cite Cyberterrorism Among Top Three Threats to U.S.” Gallup
(February 10, 2016)
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defensive and offensive operations such as “propaganda, misinformation,
and disinformation.”9 Today, most information warfare is through cyber
in the form of “botnets” or computers that are infected with a malicious
software that can be used without the owner’s knowledge. Social media has
also become a contemporary platform through which information can be
amplified to send a specific message and generate attitudes or confusion.10
Social media is a perfect channel for information warfare because this
strategy seeks to intensify the “fog and friction” or uncertainties each side
experiences during times of war and peace by achieving political goals and
controlling information.11 Cyber has become the easiest means through
which the United States can exercise information warfare, as new strategies
of attack have been developed to include this domain. The Department of
Defense has revealed and defined cyber operations to include activities
such as “Cyber Network Attacks” which seek to “disrupt, deny, degrade or
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks.”12 CNAs
became an official part of cyber strategy when the Secretary of Defense,
William Cohen, gave the NSA the authority to develop CNA techniques in
1997. Additionally, DOD policy outlines that the United States will employ
a physical or non-physical attack “to provide support for full spectrum
dominance.”13 Secretive documents such as DOD directives imply that the
United States military and government do have the capability for offensive
cyberwar. Moreover, the United States is ready and extremely willing to
utilize cyber as a means for informational gain or stealing.
Through my research, I have found several pieces of evidence that
demonstrate the bridge between cyber and information warfare the United
States military has attempted to build. In 1997, William Black Jr. was
appointed as the Special Assistant for Information Warfare and wrote the
piece, “Thinking Out Loud about Cyberspace” for the National Security
Agency.14 Black emphasizes the recurring need for cyber technology in
the NSA and the Informational Warfare unit itself at the time. This once9 Name redacted, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45142
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018)
10 Ibid
11 Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, Princeton University Press, June 1, 1989.
12 William B. Black, National Security Agency, “Thinking Out Loud About
Cyberspace,” Cryptolog, XXIII,1 (Spring 1997). Secret.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
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classified piece is an early indication of the integration of information
warfare into the cyber domain. The National Security Agency in conjunction
with other defensive units concluded that the primary method of conducting
war in cyberspace is through Informational War tactics. In 1997, the NSA
predicted the exploitation of computers and networks, which are troves of
information, and set the agenda to include cyber a means of information
dominance by exploring the term “cyber weapons.” Offensive weapons
for information war outlined by the NSA include “viruses, worms, logic
bombs, Trojan horses, spoofing, masquerading, and ‘trap’ doors.”15 Although
these are types of software and not a physical weapon, they have the power
to destroy any nation’s information infrastructure completely if utilized
properly.16
In this case study, I will detail various instances of the use and
development of cyber weapons for informational gains by the United States.
In his book, Dark Territory, Fred Kaplan tracks the emergence of cyber units
within the United States government such as the Department of Defense
and the National Security Agency as well as their functions and strategies.
These agencies work together to achieve goals that include acquiring
information from interest nations or areas to promote an outcome ideal to
the United States interests. A little-known US target to cyber-attacks was the
Serbian military. In 1977, the US along with other NATO forces created the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) to enforce the end of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
war after the replacement of the president, Slobodan Milosevic.17 This special
force was enlisted to hunt war criminals and work in conjunction with US
based agencies such as the NSA and J-39, a secret unit within the Pentagon’s
Joint Staff.18 On March 24, 1999 NATO forces began a bombing campaign
against the Federation of Yugoslavia which sought to ethnically cleanse the
Balkan region. During the attack, US forces relied on spoofing techniques to
intercept and stop military communications from the enemy. The specialized
J-39 unit commanded hacks on the Serbian air defense system, sending
false directions to aircrafts and relaying wrong informational updates.
The changes were slight so that the Serbs could not detect their computer
systems were interrupted by US commanded B-2 Spirit stealth bombers.
“Spoofing” is when a person or program successfully imitates another by
15 Ibid
16 Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory(New York: Simon Schuster, 2016)
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
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sending false data to the recipient and this is a basic example of how cyber
is utilized as a tool by the US to gain a political/military advantage. This
military operation ended in the bombing of Yugoslavia and allowed for US/
NATO peacekeeping forces to enter the region. Since its inception in 1977,
the SFOR and joint agencies have developed such offensive capabilities for
informational gain in both military and civilian operations.
David Sanger with The New York Times reported in 2012 of another
virus, Flame, in his article, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against
Iran.”19 Flame illustrates a contemporary example of the US ability to steal,
copy, and share information. This code was a continuation of the original
US-created code named Duqu, which was a reconnaissance tool that could
copy blueprints of Iran’s nuclear program. The newer Flame virus sent a
visible code onto Iranian officials’ computer to essentially steal information
on Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.20 No single state has claimed
Duqu or Flame, but later findings suggest it was the work of the United
States and Israel. The nature of these events insinuates a physical attack since
a USB was manually inserted into these individuals’ personal computers.21
However, physical damage was just a secondary objective for these two
cyber operations. Flame and Duqu were utilized as a covert method to steal
information from Iran. It had the sole purpose of achieving a political goal
just as any informational warfare operation. These instances prove to be
unique, however. Cyber was the domain of warfare for this operation and
in an effort to remain secretive; the code could not be traced to an original
creator. This attack was successful, in that the computers affected were
useless or had their information copied and shared.22 Such events prove the
efficiency and emergence of cyber offensive tools to fulfill tasks such as
information gathering to achieve political gains.

Case Study: Psychological Cyber Tactics
Psychological warfare and its methods fall under the “umbrella”
of information warfare. The psychological war strategy conducts covert
missions or attacks to gain information. PSYOPS, or psychological
19 David Sanger, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran,” The New York
Times(June 1, 2012)
20 Ibid
21 Nicole Perlroth, “Researchers Find Clues in Malware,” The New York Times (May
30TH, 2012).
22 Ibid
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operations, has become an integral part of military defensive and offensive
plans. The Department of Defense directives define PSYOPS as operations
“meant to induce foreign attitudes favorable to the originators cause.”23
Psychological warfare is not a new phenomenon and was a powerful
tool throughout United States history. For example, during the Cold War,
President Eisenhower deployed pamphlets and boosted programs such as
Voice of America in Europe to change attitudes toward the Soviet Union
through such offensive psychological warfare tactics.24 Eisenhower’s success
reflects the possibilities and effectiveness psychological warfare can achieve
if aided with new technology such as cyber.
PSYOPS came to the forefront of operations such as those during the
Iraq War under the Bush Administration, which pushed for informational
gains and the use of psychological war to attain new material and altern
negative perceptions of the West.25 A small number of cyber uses were
stipulated by the military and US government but were not employed.
These included possible plans in which an individual can have access to a
weapon or tool that would target a specific computer or system and modify
its functions/ information it receives and spreads. Other plans detailed how
a PSYOP team could develop a website for an audience in Iraq so that
behaviors can change indirectly.26
My research indicates that psychological tactics have played a large
role in United States military operations in the past and will continue to do
so in the future. The United States Army Field Manual explicitly states that
PSYOPS “are meant to change the behavior of a foreign target audience to
support U.S. national objectives.”27 In 2005, the tasks of PSYOPS soldiers
were written to be to develop, design, produce, distribute, disseminate, and
evaluate psychological war materials and tools.28 Cyber can be used in the
23 Name redacted, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45142
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018)
24 Kenneth A. Osgood, Form Before Substance Eisenhower Commitment to
Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy, Diplomatic History
25 Christopher J. Lamb, “Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from
Recent Operational Experience,” (Washington DC: National Defense University Press,
September 2005).
26 Ibid
27 Department of the Army. “Tactical Psychological Operations: Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures,” (Manual, Department of the Army, Washington DC, October 28,
2005)
28 Ibid
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form of social media and the Internet, for example, by interfering with the
interactions and information an individual receives. The Internet has become
increasingly utilized as a means of achieving psychological war through
cyber. The United States has ownership of the Internet and has utilized it as a
tool for democracy in nations all over the world. For example, after bombing
Yugoslavia with NATO forces, the US decided to allow Serbians to maintain
access to the internet to allow the people to see the atrocities committed in
Kosovo by the Milosevic regime.29 Additionally, the Serbian government
attempted to stop the independent radio station, B92, from organizing
protests. When this occurred, B92’s transmission was broadcasted to the
Internet and relayed back to Serbia by the British Broadcasting Channel and
Voice of America radio stations.30 This case demonstrates the US’s attempt
to bolster Serbian support after an exploitative and violent US venture and
displayed the ease of utilizing cyber for a political gain through an everyday
institution such as the Internet.
Similarly, a contemporary use of psychological warfare through means
of cyber can be seen through Operation Iraqi Freedom during the Iraq
war. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States employed various
methods to gain US support in Iraq against troubling political figures such
as Saddam Hussein.31 During this operation, broadcast messages were sent
from Air Force plane, EC-130E and from Navy ships operating on the
Persian Gulf. These messages were accompanied by a barrage of emails,
faxes, and cell phone calls to numerous Iraqi leaders.32 The message being
sent by US forces was to abandon Saddam Hussein. In hopes of changing
public opinion, the US military led Operation Iraqi Freedom utilizing cyber
and psychological warfare. Military Deception or “MILDEC” is a strategy
used by the United States army that relies on sending false signals to the
enemy. Deception is a primary part of psychological warfare in that it keeps

29 Briscoe; Jon Swartz, “Administration Drops Idea of Blocking Serb Net Sites,”
The San Francisco Chronicle, 15 May 1999: in Eden-Webster Passports/Lexis-Nexis
[database online], World News library.
30 David J. Rothkopf, “Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of Power in the
Information Age,” Journal of International Affairs 51 (Spring 1998): in Columbia,
International Affairs Online [database online], (9 January 2001).
31 Catherine Dale, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and
Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. RL 34387, (Washington DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2008)
32 Ibid

9

Shafali Raj

the enemy or public unaware of reality or of future outcomes.33 During
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States used deceptive methods such as
the Navy’s Tactical Air Launched Decoy system. This tool could divert fire
from Iraqi air defenses using a digital capability, making aircrafts unsure of
the target or source of attacks in the sky. The United States’ attempts display
that offensive methods, coupled with discrete operations such as building
fake websites, yield the strength and magnitude to influence the political
objectives/opinions of individuals.
Psychological operations are critical to the United States’ endeavors
and is deployed abroad and domestically. Today, the US counts on the Media
Operations Center at Fort Bragg, which is accountable for printing and
disseminating audio, video, and print psychological operation products.34
Since the actual production of psychological warfare materials are done
domestically, there must be an efficient and overt method of spreading
this information abroad. Cyber is a primary means of deploying such
materials through social media and satellite communications.35 Additionally,
Deployable Audio Production Systems is a technology widely used in
PSYOPS. Missions can be carried out with SOMS B vehicles have the
capacity to create audio and video in the air which can then be shared
using DAP technology. One of the first uses of this technology was in
Afghanistan (2001) when The Commando Solo aircraft transmitted pro
US radio broadcasts.36 Since its first use, the Commando Solo, alongside
SOMS B, have been vital to US interests in bolstering support in the Middle
East. These are just a handful of cyber technologies that make the spread of
psychological warfare materials efficient and possible beyond conventional
methods.

Case Study: Physical Cyber Tactics
The Department of Defense defines the cyberspace domain as consisting
of three interdependent “layers” including the physical, the logical, and
the cyber persona. “Physical” refers to the environment of devices and the
33 Clay Wilson, Information Operations and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related
Policy Issues, CRS Report No. RL31787, (Washington DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2006)
34 Christopher J. Lamb, “Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from
Recent Operational Experience,” (Washington DC: National Defense University Press,
September 2005).
35 Ibid
36 Ibid
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geographical location of these systems.37 This is the network of people and
materials. Therefore, a physical attack can also be on a computer or a system
that causes a degradation of the material item itself.38 This is a strategy that
carries a human aspect because it requires one’s presence and compliance
to attack another entity. Past events of physical cyber-attacks suggest these
types of operations carry a specific target and are motivated by a material or
political gain since the nature is destructive and deliberate. A contemporary
example of this would be the Stuxnet malware which stunted Iran’s
development of nuclear weapons by stopping uranium enrichment processes
in nuclear facilities.
In 2010, fifteen plants across Iran reported technical failures and
difficulties in nuclear plant processes. These malfunctions were later found
to be the result of “Stuxnet,” a malicious software and the first known “cyber
weapon.”39 This event is also considered the first “act of force” using cyber.
Stuxnet was the only malicious software of its kind, specifically designed to
interact with and destroy a nuclear Industrial Control System. The Stuxnet
code targets a Microsoft application that the nuclear ICS devices use daily
during uranium enrichment operations. That being said, the virus can enter
devices through a USB or gaps in internet connection. However, the nature of
Stuxnet implied that it must have been implemented in person at the facilities
or by an insider. Stuxnet is significant because it was the first code that set
out to inhibit the production of nuclear materials. It was also a part of a larger
campaign for offensive cyber operations entitled, Operation Olympic Games.
This operation began under the Bush Administration in 2006 and continued
under Obama as a cyber-campaign against Iran, which was made possible
with the help of US friendly, Israel.40
Operation Olympic Games was a secretive joint effort made between the
US and Israeli governments to cripple and destabilize Iran’s nuclear program
entirely. Cyber was the chosen domain of warfare for this operation and
cyber weapons were central to the plan of Olympic Games.41 This revelation
37 Catherine Theohary and Anne Harrington, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and
Plans: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R43848 (Washington DC, Congressional
Research Service, 2015)
38 Ibid
39 David Sanger, “Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran,” The New York
Times(June 1, 2012)
40 David Sanger, Confront and Conceal (Broadway Books, June 2012)
41 Ibid
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starkly contrasts the notion that the United States is a victim to cyber threats
given its role in the first contemporary mass cyber-attack. Eventually, cyber
and tech experts from around the world revealed the dark components of the
virus. This code held features described by scholars as “dual warheads,”
that remain dormant and send false signals to computer systems signaling
that things are running normally when they are not.42 The code is a weapon
in every way given its precise duty and properties. One part was designed
to specifically command 984 machines linked together. This is the same
number of downed uranium- enrichment centrifuges, inspectors at the Natanz
plant reported following the attack.43 With these attributes, Stuxnet was
truly the first cyber-weapon, enabling a physical attack on a political target.
The realities of the Stuxnet attack contradicts the notion that the US is only
developing weapons and not utilizing harmful offensive components. Stuxnet
was formulated not to only send a message, but to destroy the enemy target
just as any military operation might seek to do.
Stuxnet was used as a weapon against Iran for the advancement of US
political goals in that it delayed Iran’s nuclear program by downing almost
10,000 Industrial devices. Furthermore, I have found several manifestations
of the intent and use of cyber weapons as a part of a political/material
gain by the United States. In 2017, The United States-Israel Cybersecurity
Cooperation Enhancement Act passed the House of Representatives. This
bill requires The Department of Homeland Security to create a fund limited
to US and Israeli citizens for research and development on cyber protection,
response, and strategies.44 The adopted amendment provides for a “Cyber
Center of Excellence,” for the development of new capabilities. This
example directly displays the intent to continue developing and using cyber
strategies or weapons on a political target.45 The strategic relationship with
Israel can be applied to any other country the US seeks intelligence from in
developing new capabilities of warfare such as cyber weapons. This update
indicated that the US is willing to negotiate and work with other nations to
42 Paul Kerr, John Rollins, Catherine Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm:
Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability, CRS Report No. R41524 (Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010)
43 Ibid
44 [1]U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Cybersecurity Cooperation
Enhancement Act. 2017. 115thCongress.
45 The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, “Bill Summary Cybersecurity
Cooperation Enhancement Act,” (March 2018)
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create offensive cyber strategies on specific political targets such as Iran.
Through my research, I have found the intent of the United States has not
changed since the inception of Operation Olympic Games in 2006. These are
just a few examples that have been exposed as linked to US intelligence and
military operations but there are still many unknowns.

Implications
With the emergence of cyber, leaders are faced with new issues and
challenges their predecessors did not have to contemplate. Stuxnet is an
important example for world politics in that it was the first well-known
cyber weapon and was able to conduct a physical threat and influence later
events. I believe the United States must take accountability for developing
these technologies. The United States set a precedent by utilizing cyber for
physical, psychological, and informational gains and must be responsible for
the repercussions. Both states and independent actors have learned from the
US example. As cyber becomes a legitimate domain of war, it is inevitable
states will compete for the most powerful cyber weapons. This leads me
to question, just how far the US and other states are willing to go for cyber
dominance. History reveals that weapons such as the nuclear bomb had
the power to change history forever. I can imagine a cyber-weapon of this
magnitude as being possible in the future.
Addressing US cyber offensive strategies is vital in recognizing the
power and influence of the United States in areas such as military strength.
Although common rhetoric puts the United States at the hands of foreign
cyber threats, it is vital to understand that the United States remains a
global power and is willing to utilize cyber in international politics. The
US has proven its willingness to use cyber weapons through these three
case studies. As cyber weapons are increasingly developed and utilized, the
public remains unaware. Today, top news stories detail foreign involvement
in the US political process through the Internet and social media outlets.
These recent events signal that cyber-attacks or war is increasingly viable
and can be hidden for long periods of time. This leads me to ask the future
capabilities of sabotage by the United States and foreign actors as well
in addition to attacks the public might never know about. Therefore, it is
important that instances such as Stuxnet are discussed for security and the
formation of future policy or norms.
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